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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
The Appellate Division allowed a reduced amount which it found reasonable,
and the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.
The Court held that the services rendered by Thomy were necessary to the
estate and because of their nature and extent not within his duties as executor.
From Thomy's prior service to testator, testator's reliance on Thorny just prior to
his death, and the fact that the testator had nominated Thorny an executor, the
Court found it was testator's intention that Thorny continue and be compensated
for the involved accounting services which he was performing.
Cases which have allowed executors extra compensation for necessary services
outside the executor's duties have done so on two grounds: the express or implied
intention of the testator, or the consent of the beneficiaries of the estate. Intention
sufficient to allow compensation has been inferred from testators' directions where
testator directed the executors to choose one of his sons as a manager of his
business and they chose a son who was an executor, 7 where an architect had served
decedent for many years prior to his death,8 and where the executor who was
manager of decedents business prior to his death was elected president of that
business and testator had allowed his executors discretion as to which assets
should be kept by the estate.9
The decision in this case makes no change in the rules governing the
compensation of executors, but merely reinforces numerous lower court decisions
which have allowed additional compensation where justly deserved. As the
Court indicated, such allowances do raise danger of self-dealing by fiduciaries,
but that danger is eliminated by proper judicial surveillance.
Wills-Incorporaion by Reference
New York does not permit an unattested instrument to be incorporated
into a will by reference." However, this rule against incorporation by reference
12
has not been carried to "a drily logical extreme"; and in In re Rausch's Will,
a disposition to a trust controlled by an unattested instrument was upheld. On the
authority of the Rausch case, dispositions to trusts controlled by unattested
instruments wherein the settlors reserved the power to amend have also been
6. 4 A.D.2d 310, 164 N.Y.S.2d 573 (4th Dep't 1957).
7. In re Davison, 173 Misc. 323, 17 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Surr.Ct. 1940).
8. Russel v. Hilton, 37 Misc. 642, 76 N.Y.Supp. 233 (Sup.Ct. 1902), modified on other grounds 80 App.Div. 178, 80 N.Y.Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1903).
9. In re Berl, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.Supp. 466 (Surr.Ct. 1927).
11. Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
12. 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
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upheld."3 In the latter cases, the settlor's mere reservation of the power to amend
or alter the trust instrument has not proven fatal to the validity of the disposition;
and if the unattested document was in existence at the time of the execution
of tl_. will, if it is dearly identified and is such that it ex-ludes the possibility
of alteration, fraud, or mistake, incorporation of that document will be
14
permitted.
A prior case, President and Dirm-cor of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz,15 held
that where an amendment to the trust instrument changes the beaeficiaries, the
incorporation by reference will not be permitted. In that case, the testator, after
the execution of his will, added two supplemental indentures to the trust agreement whereby he eliminated, in the first, certain beneficiaries and changed his
wife's interest, and in the second, deleted one beneficiary and substituted another.
The Court said that the disposition of the property was being made not by the
will, but by the shifting provisions in the trust instrument; and to allow the
incorporation of the trust indenture would allow the testator to circumvent
section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law by an instrument not published and
attested as required. The Court further stated that the testamentary disposition
will fail altogether, since it would defeat the purpose and intention of the testator
to have the property pass in accordance with the original terms of the inter
vivos trust.
The Janowitz case has during the last term been tacitly distinguished by
In re Ivies Will.16 In the Ivie case, the testator created a trust in 1932 and
reserved the right to amend the trust; he exercised this retained power by
changing the trustees twice, once in 1941 and once in 1949. In the final amendment, he relinquished all power to alter or amend the trust. The will, which was
executed in 1941 after the first amendment, recited the creation, provisions, and
first amendment of the trust. The Court, in upholding a bequest to the trust,
held that since the trust remained unimpaired and substantially the same the
amendments which concerned only the administrative provisions of the trust
deed would not bring the unartested instrument within the purview of the rule
against incorporation by reference.
If this retained power of the settler to amend or alter the trust instrument
is exercised, the change effected will be determinative in applying the rule.
Therefore, New York will generally permit the incorporation of unattestetd
instruments even though they have been amended if the amendment reflects no
13. In re Bremer's Will, 156 Misc. 160, 281 N.Y.Supp. 264 (1935); In re

Tlffany's Estate, 157 Misc. 873, 285 N.Y.Supp. 971 (1935); In re Andrus' Estate,
156 Misc. 268, 281 N.YSupp. 831 (1935); In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459
(Surr.Ct. 1953).
14. See note 13, wupra.
15. 260 App.Div. 174, 21 N.YS.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
16. 4 N.Y.2d 178, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
change in the testamentary intention or volition and the elements of fraud or
mistake are lacking. This relaxation of the rule against incorporation by reference
will not lead to the evils the rule seeks to prevent, since the court in each instance
will evaluate the substance of any amendments.
Wills-Power of Appointment
In many will cases involving the exercise of a power of appointment the
property over which the person has a power may be in one state while the will
in question was drawn in another. The construction of a will insofar as it involves
exercise or non-exercise of a power of appointment when the donor of the power
is domiciled in New York, and the situs of the property involved is New York,
is governed by the law of New York.17
A governing statute in New York concerning the construction of a will
states:
Power to bequeath executed by general provisions in will. Personal
property embraced in a power to bequeath, passes by a will or testament
purporting to pass all the personal property of the testator; unless the
intent, that the will or testament shall not operate as an execution of
18
the power, appears therein either expressly or by necessary implication.
The Court of Appeals in the case of In re Deane's Will" had to determine
the law to be applied to and the construction to be placed on a general devise
of personal property under a will drawn in Texas. The testatrix had been giveil
a power of appointment over a trust fund amounting to some $800,000 by her
former husband. The testatrix in a general bequest left all her personal property
to her grandson. Since the donor of the trust was a resident of New York and
created the trust in New York, the Court applied the law of New York in
construing the will. The required intent (under section 18 of the Personal
Property Law) not to exercise the power of appointment did not appear in her
bequest of personal property under the will. Outside evidence as to statements
made during the drafting of the will dearly indicated that the testatrix did not
wish to exercise the power of appointment. However, the Court decided that
under the express terms of section 18, outside evidence is of no effect unless the
requisite intention not to exercise the power is found in the wilL
The Court of Appeals in strictly adhering to the language of the statute
also reaffirmed In re Smith 20 stating: that "direct statements of intention" are
17. In re Philbrick, 209 N.Y. 585, 103 N.E. 315 (1913); adopting the rule
of Massachusetts in Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882).
18.

N. Y. PERS. PRop. LAW §18.

19. 4 N.Y.2d 326, 175 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1958).
20. 254 N.Y. 283, 172 N.E. 499 (1930).

